A change in rhetoric brings the Three Seas Initiative closer to its original purpose

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Three Seas Initiative has positioned itself as a key platform for regional security, defence integration, and as a bulwark against Russian influence in the region, a significant shift from its previous priorities of regional development and economic parity with Western Europe. Yet the initiative’s history as an anti-Russian project traces back to its very inception, predating the Russian invasion.

On 25 August 2016, the first Summit of the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) was held in the coastal city of Dubrovnik, hosted by then Croatian president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović. It drew together 12 EU states from the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black seas: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Greece has since joined as a full member of the TSI as of 2023.

At its inception, the TSI was presented as an economic project responding to the recognised economic disparity between the west and east parts of the EU. Academics and politicians have noted that accession into the European Union has failed to sufficiently address the developmental deficit amongst states in Central and Eastern Europe attributed to the region’s twentieth-century communist legacy. In the mid-2010s, the political classes, especially of Poland and Croatia, felt that although the EU had brought with it political integration and connectivity, European Union membership alone would not provide the economic integration and connectivity that their states needed.

Since its founding in 2016, the TSI has ostensibly changed little in its core responsibilities. It is still as it was: an intergovernmental body, without a political structure, tasked with the raising and disbursement of funds for infrastructure, digital, and energy projects in 13 Central and Eastern European states.

Yet in 2024, the apparent nature of the TSI has shifted significantly. The scheme has undergone significant  changes in how it chooses to promote itself, both to potential investors and to the rest of the world. The rhetoric employed in its statements, declarations, and vision has changed considerably, from describing an initiative prioritising the development of infrastructure in line with Western Europe, to presenting what is purportedly a new anti-Russian power bloc that is best suited for the task of supporting regional defence integration and economic support for Ukraine.

Shifts in rhetoric

With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Three Seas Initiative began to redefine itself. In subsequent press releases, events, and summits, the focus of the initiative came to reflect the focus of the entire region. No longer does the scheme vocally prioritise what it can offer the regional economy, or on closing the EU’s development gap between west and east. Instead, the TSI has increasingly advertised itself as the platform with which to address its members’ shared security concerns.

Comparing the joint declaration from the Sixth TSI Summit held in Sofia in 2021 with the most recent joint declaration from the Ninth TSI Summit in Vilnius in 2024, a change in rhetoric is clear. The 2021 Sofia declaration is centred mainly on the subjects of ‘connectivity’, ‘co-financing mechanisms’, and ‘region-wide balance’. In contrast, the 2024 Vilnius declaration is composed of ‘strategic interests’, ‘military mobility’ and ‘Europe’s security’. In fact, the term ‘security’ is mentioned only once in the 2021 joint declaration, a stark difference to the not-insignificant 21 times in 2024.

This of course reflects the significant domestic and foreign policy shifts in Europe brought about by Russia’s invasion. The shared concern amongst many member states about their economic reliance on Russian gas imports rapidly mobilised the bloc to seek alternative energy solutions. Czechia, for example, reduced imports of Russian gas by 94%, instead relying increasingly on gas imports from Norway. Poland, whose own energy use remains largely based on coal, has rapidly expanded the use of the Świnoujście Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) terminal for export across the region, alongside Croatia whose Krk LNG terminal began operations in 2021.

Alongside Poland and Croatia, the main economic benefactor of the transition away from Russian gas is the United States, from whom 24.2% of the world’s natural gas originated in 2023.

The message that the TSI wishes to project to the world is that it is the platform best suited to facilitate supporting, rebuilding, and then later integrating Ukraine into the European economy. In September 2023, Ukraine was officially welcomed into the scheme as an associated state alongside Moldova, providing both countries with greater political involvement and access to investment from the Three Seas Initiative.

Since then, the TSI 2024 summit set as a priority project the reconstruction of Ukrainian infrastructure and energy networks in the event of a Ukrainian victory, which would ease Ukraine’s work to meet the requirements of EU accession and improve economic integration with neighbouring countries, in addition to giving important assurances that the country won’t be abandoned following a Ukrainian victory.

However, perhaps most significantly, it has the effect of making Ukrainian reconstruction and economic support synonymous with the TSI. This is an incredibly powerful tool for a scheme whose main organisational priority remains to attract investors to the region and  to the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund.

The Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund promises potential investors “an attractive return on investment of approximately 6%.” Individual member states can and have contributed billions of euros towards projects, supplemented also by funding from the EU, but the initiative remains dependent on financial investment from the private sector and foreign governments in order to reach its targets.

Becoming the main platform through which to support Ukrainian reconstruction has not only earned TSI international recognition as the most significant bloc in the region, but also made it an incredibly attractive investment opportunity for foreign capitalists expecting an inevitable capital surge into postwar Ukraine.

One interpretation of this pivot towards Ukraine, and the scheme’s general prioritisation of security rhetoric, could argue that the TSI is attempting to appeal for investment from those countries seeking to counter the perceived threat from Russia, first amongst them being the US.

Already this year, the US government’s Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced a financial package of up to $300 million for the TSI’s Investment Fund. Beata Daszyńska-Muzyczka, the chairperson of the Supervisory Board of the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, stated that “the current geopolitical and economic challenges have highlighted the importance of the Three Seas Region”.

The original purpose of the TSI

Although the rhetoric around the TSI has changed, its original purpose has not. The initiative is now only being more transparently presented.

The TSI was always designed as a means to challenge Russian influence in the region and further bring Central European states in line with US foreign policy. The TSI itself cites a report by the US think tank Atlantic Council as being the driving inspiration for the development of the Three Seas Initiative.

This 2014 report, titled Completing Europe, claims a lack of EU investment to and political attention on Central Europe threatens European cohesion and leaves the region politically vulnerable to internal and external threats. Through economic integration, it is argued, the North-South corridor of Central and Eastern European states will become more bound to one another, to Western Europe, and thus to US foreign policy interests.

The paper stresses that there is a need to reanimate the North-South corridor from the Baltic to the Black Sea so as to prevent the region’s economic and political weakness to and dependency on Russia. This paper was written in the context of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and its shut-off of natural gas exports to Ukraine, highlighting the risk of Russian political and economic influence in Europe.

As a think tank, the Atlantic Council is as close as can be to a mouthpiece of the US government. It is best known for its advocacy of US foreign policy and NATO interests internationally, and has since continued to sow wide connections within the US State Department, the US intelligence community, and the Chamber of Commerce.

The links to the Marshall Plan are of particular interest, and direct calls to replicate the plan in Ukraine have been made by US think tank German Marshall Fund. Given that the Marshall Plan’s primary role was to challenge Soviet and communist influence in postwar Europe and to stimulate the import of US goods into European states, comparisons between it and the Three Seas Initiative can be easily drawn.

The paper illustrates particular economic opportunities for the US, as by bringing about energy independence from Russia for Central European states through the development of greater energy infrastructure, it can create a new market for US gas exports. This is presented as an opportunity for both Poland and Croatia, who had both begun to develop terminals in their countries, through which LNG could be imported from the US and dispensed across the entire region. This is widely considered to be the crux that launched Poland and Croatia’s joint development of the scheme.

Not only is greater regional energy independence from Russia in the economic interest of Poland and Croatia, it projects them into a position of greater importance in the region, and advertises both countries as worthwhile targets of investment.

Poland in particular, which in 2014 was headed by the mildly Eurosceptic PiS party, made no secret of its ambitions of a more assertive role within Central and Eastern Europe. PiS saw the development of intergovernmental schemes with Poland at the helm as a key part of their strategy for achieving this, echoing the historic inter-war Międzymorze (intermarium) concept.

This became increasingly relevant as the relationship between the PiS government and the EU soured, as Poland could begin to rely on at least some other sources of potential investment in the face of the EU’s fines and withholding of funds. The PiS government therefore became one of the strongest advocates for a strong and politically distinct TSI.

Yet, since the victory of the coalition led by the Europhile Civic Platform in November 2023, the full importance of the TSI to Polish foreign policy has been in doubt. Whilst in public statements the new Polish government has reaffirmed all of its commitment to the TSI, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, himself President of the European Council at the time of the TSI’s founding, has been looking to improve Poland’s standing within the European Union.

Events held by Poland regarding the future direction of the TSI, such as a conference at the Polish embassy in Bratislava, have promoted greater synergy between the EU and the TSI, indicating that Poland seeks to link the two projects together rather than maintain two parallel power blocs. Tusk, however, has his political ambitions limited by the competences of the President of Poland, an office still held by PiS figurehead and TSI founder Andrzej Duda.

Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, it can be argued that the TSI has found itself in its strongest position yet. The perceived threat of Russia to Europe’s eastern border is being taken more seriously than ever, raising its profile, and simultaneously attracting international attention as an investment opportunity.

However, the newfound strength of the TSI comes at a time when greater splits are occurring in the foreign policy direction of Central and Eastern Europe. Whilst PiS may have been ousted in Poland, illiberal and Eurosceptic parties have made significant gains in the most recent EU elections, and their attitudes towards Russia, particularly with regards to Russian energy, threaten the strongly anti-Russian sentiment that increasingly serves as the TSI’s main motivator.