Abkhazia at the end of a road? Difficult choices in a contentious election

Relations between Abkhazia and Russia reached their lowest point by late 2024. Last year’s dramatic end saw the resignation of Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania, and a shooting in parliament. Regardless of the outcome of snap elections on 15 February, Abkhazia’s political class has few options but to mend relations with Moscow.

Abkhazia finished 2024 on tenuous footing. Gunfire erupted in the parliament during a discussion on the banning of cryptocurrency mining amid a violent argument between MPs Adgur Kharazia and Kan Kvarchia. Kharazia allegedly drew a firearm and shot at Kvarchia, fatally injuring fellow MP Vakhtang Golandzia, who had attempted to mediate. Kvarchia, meanwhile, sustained injuries but is reported to be in stable condition. Amid the chaos, Kharazia himself fled into hiding. Moscow has since allegedly revoked his Russian citizenship.

The crypto ban will continue until 2026. Electricity consumption has risen by nearly 50% in Abkhazia since 2020, primarily due to cryptocurrency mining operations. Unfortunately for Abkhazia, its poorly maintained power grid depends on a hydroelectric system dependent on seasonal fluctuations, thus the government has relied on Russia to cover the deficit. According to Abkhaz MP Dmitry Marshania, “The Abkhaz authorities are not taking the energy issues seriously.”

Following a spat of protests in November over Sukhumi’s (Sukhum’s) enabling of further Russian investment into Abkhazia, Moscow began selling electricity to Abkhazia at market rates, causing severe power cuts. At the end of the year, Russia agreed to help mitigate the energy crisis. According to Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Abkhazia will be supplied with electricity until the elections in February.

Most significant of the turbulent year’s developments was the resignation of Abkhazia’s president, Aslan Bzhania, on 18 November. Vice President Badra Gunba stepped in as acting president before deciding to run in the elections himself as somewhat of a stand-in for Bzhania. Once registered, former Prime Minister Valeriy Bganba became acting President. 

How we got here

In a 19 September interview, Bzhania defended ties with Moscow, arguing that agreements with Russia were crucial for stability. Amid declining support for Bzhania’s agenda, opposition parties asserted that the Abkhazian parliament was the primary legitimate authority and pressed for a slowdown on bills relating to the judiciary. Despite opposition pushback, the parliament ratified a judicial agreement with Russia on 25 September, raising concerns about Russian influence over Abkhazia’s legal system and undermining local governance.

An investment agreement signed between Abkhazia and Russia on 30 October escalated protests beyond a boiling point. The deal, signed by Economic Ministers Kristina Ozgan and Maksim Reshetnikov, offered Russian legal entities an eight-year exemption from property taxes to boost investment. Critics, like prominent former MP Akhra Bzhania, argued that the deal ”threatens Abkhazia’s sovereignty and local businesses.” Opposition leader Adgur Ardzinba also expressed concerns about foreign investors’ wishes being prioritised over national interests and the risks to Abkhazia’s banking system.

The agreement’s signing sparked unrest in early November, with graffiti targeting government policies and further vandalism taking place at public sites in Sukhumi. Although opposition groups condemned these actions, five opposition activists were arrested on 11 November, sparking further protests. Protesters then stormed the Abkhazian parliament, demanding Bzhania’s resignation and the release of detainees. Ultimately, the parliament scrapped the investment deal in December with a 21-0 vote.

However, this did little to calm tensions between pro-Moscow leaders and the more nationalist- or sovereigntist-leaning opposition.

Some of this disagreement is rooted in the proposed ‘foreign agent law’ from this past summer, and a contentious agreement transferring the Pitsunda state dacha to Russia, which activists condemned as a violation of sovereignty. Clashes had already erupted in July 2024 over a so-called ‘apartment law’, which allows foreigners, especially Russians, to buy property in the region. This raised concerns about real estate prices and demographic shifts.

Relations with Russia fell further still, when a leaked document bearing the signature of Russian official Dmitry Kozak outlined demands that could damage Abkhazia’s economy and threaten opposition politicians. Former Prime Minister Valeriy Bganba criticised the alleged demands as “blackmail” and called for clarity from the Russian Embassy. 

Nowhere to go

Although popular discontent and opposition pressure led to Bzhania’s resignation in November, Abkhazia is left with few options. Its 2025 budget includes ₽5.2 billion (€54 million) in financial assistance from Russia, unchanged from previous years and amounting to about 30% of the total budget revenue. This comes despite a year of strained relations with Moscow — in 2024, Abkhazia failed to receive ₽1.8 billion (€19 million) due to unmet agreements.

This year’s Russian funds will primarily support Abkhazia’s socio-economic development, with €3.9 billion (€41 million) allocated specifically for this purpose. Past financial data and government statements indicate that, despite local concern, external budget support remains indispensable for Abkhazia.

With little else in hand, Abkhazia could find itself right back where it was before. An activist group has devised a series of constitutional reforms to tackle some of the country’s fiscal and political problems. The primary question remains whether this is enough. Regardless of who wins later this month, the same balance must be achieved between cultivating relations with Russia and maintaining Abkhazian sovereignty.

Abkhazian nationalism is complex, as the region seeks independence while historically depending on Russia. In 2020, Pål Kolstø, a professor of Russian and post-Soviet Studies at the University of Oslo, described this dynamic as “biting the hand that feeds them.” Abkhazia’s constitution restricts foreign property ownership and requires fluency in Abkhaz for public office.

Notwithstanding the Abkhazians’ obstinacy, recent events were “not a protest against Russia, as the West shows little interest in Abkhazia,” says Omar Kharchela, an Abkhazian graduate student based in Germany. He believes many in Abkhazia find little hope in the West or Georgia. “Abkhaz people remember that shifting alliances have historically threatened their existence, making such moves risky.”

Despite tensions between Russia and Abkhazia on the one hand and between Georgia and the West on the other, a grand bargain between Moscow and Tbilisi over breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not on the horizon.

Russia, meanwhile, has sent Sergey Kiriyenko — a Sukhumi-born Russian technocrat — to mend relations and push its agenda in advance of the upcoming elections. 

“Kiriyenko’s visit signals Dmitry Kozak’s waning influence in Russia’s neighbourhood,” writes regional analyst Olesya Vartanyan. “Known for managing newly captured Ukrainian areas, Kiriyenko brings order to projects but avoids deep involvement in contentious issues.”

Given that mistrust in Tbilisi runs deep, there is no tangible way forward for Sukhumi’s new leadership other than to put fixing the recent rift in relations with Moscow at the top of Abkhazia’s agenda following the election on 15 February.