Whither Europe? Illiberalism in Georgia and the dilemma of Eastern Enlargement

Contradictions

These steps from the ruling party, and the confidence with which they have been taken, unveil deep contradictions at the heart of Georgian society and politics. Georgia’s own constitution requires its government to “take all measures within the scope of their competencies to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” Surveys have consistently demonstrated that more than 80 percent of the country supports membership in the EU.

Even the ruling party’s salvos against the political opposition are qualified with assurances that Georgia must “attain full membership in the European family.” However, compliance with the EU’s expectation in regard to election transparency and de-oligarchisation directly threaten the interests of a ruling party with close ties to figures such as Ivanishvili.

EU membership also demands a more serious reckoning with human rights and the rule of law in a state that remains unwilling or unable to protect them, a fact made alarmingly clear in the seemingly annual beatings which are perpetrated at Tbilisi’s Pride events and parades by far-right agitators. While social attitudes in Georgia have grown more liberal in the years since independence, the persistence of this fissure within society has provided politicians with a useful foil through which they may shore up support against their primary rival, the United National Movement (UNM).

Indeed, UNM – and particularly their founder Mikheil Saakashvili – themselves embody some of the paradoxes at the root of Georgia’s troubles. While once the standard-bearer for European integration and liberalism in Georgia, the latter years of Saakashvili’s presidency were beset by human rights abuses and corruption scandals, leading to UNM’s loss of power in 2012.

Attempts by the EU to support rule of law and policing reforms became weaponised under their rule, as the state increasingly restricted the space for political dissent with violent police repression. Even a decade later, the spectre of Saakashvili’s return haunts the country’s leading opposition party and provides GD with ample fodder to label political opponents as “liberal fascists” and dismiss European demands which include Saakashvili’s release from prison on humanitarian grounds.

“This is partly why the foreign agent law is so dangerous,” Sirbiladze pointed out, “civil society maintains a credibility with the public that the political parties often lack.” The resources poured by Washington and Brussels into developing this reliable partner towards the country’s European integration over the last thirty years may yet be in vain if the law ultimately passes. 

Western officials have been hesitant to place direct blame on GD, until recently avoiding a confrontational tone and giving Georgian officials space to adjust the law to address their concerns. Indeed, the US Embassy took great pains previously to highlight the key differences between the proposed Georgian law and its alleged American counterpart, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

Some activists, including Sirbiladze, are sceptical that this will help: “The European Union should send a clear message that GD is guilty of this. It should send a very clear message. If they address the issue of the oligarch [Ivanishvili], if they levy sanctions, that’s it.” The Georgian Dream party, in the meantime, appears to have grown less willing to communicate, even turning down an invitation in early May to discuss the US-Georgian relationship, according to the American Ambassador. The breakdown in communications has been years in the making.

In Orbán’s orbit

Insofar as Georgia’s contradictions relate to the country’s place in the European Union, GD figures like Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and his predecessor Irakli Garibashvili have gradually aligned with the bloc’s own illiberal bogeyman, Hungarian PM Viktor Orban. This relationship grew close during the coronavirus pandemic, as Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó became the first foreign official to visit Georgia during the outbreak. High-level visits to Budapest from the Georgian government soon followed, culminating in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement in 2023.

Orbán’s circumscribed approach to liberalism and his self-declared project to build an “illiberal state” were a natural fit for Georgian Dream, who have now made multiple pilgrimages to conservative political conferences in Budapest aimed at selling this vision to whoever will listen, including politicians and New Right activists from the US’ Republican Party and now-ousted members of the previous Polish government under the Law and Justice party. Increasing alignment between these actors, especially within the EU, undermines the bloc’s ability to pursue a unified approach to rule of law in their preference for elite dominance over state institutions, in addition to their at-times tenuous commitment to the bloc’s common foreign policy. For governments in Hungary and Georgia, such is the price for their buy-in to the European project, which itself is increasingly seeing electoral success by far-right parties such as the ascendent Brothers of Italy and Alternative for Germany. 

Most importantly for Georgia, the “illiberal state” provided an ideological justification for the party’s capture of the judiciary and silencing of critical media platforms. As the relationship between Georgian Dream (still nominally a centre-left party) and its partners in the Party of European Socialists has largely ended through its exit from the parliamentary bloc, GD could still count on Orbán’s Hungary to advocate for the country’s candidacy into the EU. Further, the relationship allowed political leadership in Georgia to reap the political rewards of candidacy status without having to weaken their hold on power and fully adhere to the EU’s expectations. With Hungary’s presidency over the European Council beginning in July, the relationship may grow even more fruitful.

Between a Rock and a hard place

This presents a dilemma for Brussels. On the one hand, increasing aggression from Moscow has intensified pressure to bring aspiring members on Europe’s vulnerable eastern flank into the fold. The European Union’s enlargement policy emphasises its role in stabilising the bloc’s near abroad. However, Russia has grown increasingly destabilising since February 2022 by exacerbating tensions over migrants, undermining regional energy security, and violating the sovereignty of its neighbours. Failure to bring Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia into the fold now could endanger their trajectory over the longer term, even if the current governments are not the most liberal or reliable partners.

On the other hand, Orbán’s schtick has become enough of a nuisance on its own, and the EU may grow only more dysfunctional by absorbing his “strategic partner” without serious reforms being undertaken by Tbilisi. Even if the European Union were to ignore democratic backsliding in Georgia in the interest of bringing the country out of the rain and under its own umbrella, there are no guarantees that GD would not find new reasons to stall the accession process for its own partisan purposes. Such a development could even prove damaging to the enlargement policy as a whole, which stands to lose credibility in its acceptance of behaviour by candidates clearly at odds with the expectations of member states.