Russia’s periphery nightmare 7 min read
Though Russia’s war on Ukraine has been linked to a primarily anti-NATO maneuver by the Kremlin, another lens through which this conflict can be read is the deep-rooted fear of Chinese subordination felt by Moscow. Beijing’s quiet expansion in the Russian Far East is used as a backdrop through which Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine represents a desperate internal bloc gamble to forcefully reassert primary power status before Russia’s leverage vanishes completely. Yet, as military failure appears increasingly inevitable, leaving the Kremlin almost solely reliant on nuclear deterrence, Western strategists are faced with a complex realpolitik dilemma over both the future of the war in Ukraine, as well as Russia as a whole.
Far from the European heartland where much of Russian culture and statehood developed, the sparsely populated Siberian plateau has been the cause of many longstanding anxieties for the Kremlin. The Far Eastern Federal District, rich in fossil fuels, industrial metals, and timber, has historically been the source of much of the wealth fueling the country’s economy, but has not been spared the fate of de-industrialization which has characterized large swaths of post-Soviet Russia. Investments in infrastructure and citizen’s quality of life have been largely overshadowed by the extraction economy which directs revenues and resources towards the European half of the country. Within this reality, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), who has grown to be Russia’s largest and most strategically important trading partner, has been steadily growing its influence over this region from which much of the resources fueling its growing economy come from.
Though less prevalent in public discourse, the question of Chinese expansion in Siberia has long been a matter of political and economic importance for both Moscow and Beijing. Russia’s growing dependence on China has, since the full scale invasion of Ukraine, rapidly increased. Hence, in addressing the reasons behind Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s growing influence over the Far Eastern Federal District should perhaps be more often discussed alongside the prevalent narrative of anti-Western sentiment, and expansionist ambitions.
Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has fought to maintain a semblance of parity within this emerging anti-Western Bloc. Yet, stripped of its superpower status, Moscow has watched Beijing gain near unilateral leverage over its economic direction. To Western analysts conditioned on the pacifying effects of globalization, Russia has been appearing increasingly relegated to a subordinate role: a strategic energy farm supplying China’s industrial apparatus on asymmetric terms. Supporting data indicates that since the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the Kremlin has had to shift its trading strategy increasingly towards China.
Deprived of the European market, Russia’s economy has been exporting the most valuable asset at its disposal, natural resources from Siberia, to Beijing at a significantly discounted price, with figures reported by The Moscow Times estimating a current loss in revenue of $12 billion USD over the last four years stemming from the lower prices granted to China. In return, Beijing has been flooding the Russian market with replacement goods aimed at filling the gap left by Western technology in the wake of the 2022 war on Ukraine. The trade, mostly carried out in Yuan, has kept the Russian economy somewhat stable despite the loss of its previous largest trading partner, Europe, yet this dynamics has left the country more vulnerable to further Chinese control over its long term economic independence.
Evidence of this can be found in the Advanced Special Economic Zones in Siberia, wherein the Kremlin has given PRC-backed enterprises significant leverage to conduct extraction of resources, and trade in Yuan rather than rubles, skewing local trade in this isolated part of Russia towards Beijing. As the Russian economy appears to be systematically unable to produce goods capable of filling market demands, it grows increasingly dependent on Chinese imports purchased at the cost of economic sovereignty over its lands. Yet, this progressive expansion of Chinese influence over Russia has been occurring for longer than the war on Ukraine has.
Since the 2000s, Putin’s warnings of Beijing’s increased influence over the Russian Far East have steadily grown until the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine. These warnings, though explicitly rare, highlight the acknowledgment of the existential anxiety caused by China’s demographic and economic weight. Russian policy makers have long known that the country’s inability to re-industrialize and shift away from a predominantly resource extraction based economy will likely force it further towards Chinese reliance and integration within Beijing’s sphere of influence.
In the decades following those early warnings, the Kremlin has systematically attempted to reassert dominance over the geographic regions it deemed critical to its survival – namely Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. However, lacking the economic soft power required to build a modern sphere of influence, Moscow’s attempts at Western-style economic integration faltered. Deprived of the structural power that once sustained both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, Russia has effectively been relegated to the position of a periphery power within its own emerging bloc, a reoccurring nightmare that has plagued the Russian state for centuries.
The declining Moscow regime, unable to compete economically with either the West or the East, has seen its strategic window closing. As economic stagnation persists, and over-reliance on Chinese goods becomes the norm, the invasion of Ukraine can be read as a desperate attempt to prevent a further slide into subservience by Moscow, who is fighting to preserve a degree of autonomy and seniority within its own alliance bloc. Beijing, on the other hand, has been facing increasingly high costs of infrastructure development and maintenance, as well as the need to continue growing its soft, economic and military power. If the “Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” remains Beijing’s leading priority through the coming decades, its leadership will have to continue building a system akin to that which has ensured U.S. hegemony in the post-Second World War era – a core of satellite economies from which to draw wealth and resources.
The fundamental issue at hand stems from the asymmetric goals pursued by Moscow and Beijing. Though Moscow’s leadership is keenly aware of the limitations faced by their country, recent history has shown the West that Russia is unlikely to accept a position of subservience without a fight. Beijing, on the other hand, faces a complex dilemma. Though Russia presents an excellent source of natural resources, and potential international distraction, Moscow’s goals and fight for survival risk hindering Beijing’s long term plans and stability. China needs Russia to maintain a semblance of stability to ensure its long term supply of resources, as the current cost of doing business with Russia is lower than outright managing the territories from which the resources Beijing needs are extracted. This asymmetry is already reshaping Russia’s position. The historic concern of being relegated to a position of periphery power is shaping up to be a concrete reality for the future of Moscow’s regime, as it sells off its independence to fund a war it started in an attempt to prevent this reality from materializing.
This economic subservience is compounded by military failure. The ironic tragedy in Moscow’s attempt to reassert its standing through a war with its neighbour is its complete failure to achieve its primary objective: rapidly toppling the Ukrainian government and presenting itself once more as an unchallengeable power. Instead, the sustained struggle in Ukraine signals to both Eastern and Western observers that Moscow’s true strength today rests almost solely on its status as a nuclear power. Without its nuclear deterrent guaranteeing state survival, the Russian regime’s long term endurance would be a question of when, rather than if. Fundamentally, the prolongation of the war in Ukraine has evolved into an exercise in strategic calculation for Western powers that extends far beyond Ukraine’s immediate territorial integrity.
Moscow’s position after over four years of conflict in Ukraine is more complex than ever. Structurally reliant on Beijing, it cannot afford to concede victory to the West, as the cost of war reparations and potential territorial loss would likely be too much for the already struggling economy to face, potentially triggering an even more dramatic slide towards China’s control. Western powers, keenly aware of the risks of both a fractured, as well as deeply subservient Russia, must now carefully evaluate the threats at hand. A failing Ukraine strategy might push Russia towards alternative strategies, such as an increase in hybrid warfare actions in Eastern Europe, hoping to score victories capable of showing Beijing that despite the set-backs, Moscow is not yet completely harmless. The question for NATO hence becomes to which extent it’s worth accepting Russian interference and provocation, as the alternative otherwise feeds into the actual major threat to the Western led liberal order – an all too powerful China.
