Radev’s arrival to power – and the disappointment that followed8 min read
Eight months into his first term as Bulgaria’s Prime Minister, Rumen Radev appears likely to fail to keep many of the electoral promises he made during his campaign – from tackling systemic corruption to improving the economy. In this piece, Kai Edvard Iliev analyses how Radev has set up a ‘business as usual’ course for his premiership, causing discontent which risks jeopardizing his leadership position.
December is traditionally a cold winter month, when most people think about Christmas. Bulgarians had other ideas in December 2025, when thousands marched in the streets as they demanded the resignation of Rosen Zhelyazkov’s coalition government, which had been in place for barely a year.
Soon after, in April 2026, general elections were called and Rumen Radev, Bulgaria’s eight-year-long President, headed his newly founded ‘Progressive Bulgaria’ party to a historic victory. He managed to secure enough seats to govern alone – something which only two other leaders achieved in Bulgaria’s modern history.
The main promise made by Radev during his campaign concerned the dismantlement of the oligarchic model informally known as Borisov-Peevski. This system, commonly perceived as the epitome of corruption in the country, is named after the historic alliance between Boyko Borisov, the former leader of the Christian-conservative ‘Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria’ party (GERB), and media mogul Delyan Peevski – who is currently under US and UK sanctions on grounds of corruption, influence peddling, and bribery. It is to fight this alliance and what it represents that Radev had been positioning himself as an opponent of GERB since the 2020-2021 protests against Borisov’s perceived corruption and maladministration. Since then, in the span of only five years, Bulgarians have headed to the polls eight times.
Radev’s success in the April 2026 elections, however, didn’t derive from a clear ideological stance. Many of his supporters held different beliefs, ranging from Russophile voters to conservatives who became disillusioned with GERB – especially following the European Public Prosecutor’s Office’s investigations into the alleged embezzlement of EU funds by the party’s hierarchy. Many of them stood in the protests, but at the same time were reluctant to vote for the ‘We Continue the Change party’ (PP), which was often considered to be too liberal.
The success of Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria thus came as a surprise. It managed to achieve control of Parliament with its 129 MPs, but this came as a double-edged sword. With a clear majority that had never been achieved in over a decade, it meant that voters expected real change, and fast.
In spite of Radev’s long-standing political opposition to Borisov and despite serving as President for over eight years, most of his ideas remain unclear up to this day, except for his constant opposition to the support to Ukraine: already in 2016, Radev was accepting that the freshly occupied territory of Crimea was now of Russian property. This did come as a surprise, considering his past in the army in communist times as a jet fighter pilot; and since 2022 Radev insisted that Bulgaria and the EU should negotiate with Russia, convinced that this war can only be ended through diplomacy.
Following the 2026 elections, for the first time, Radev and his party hold real power, and their absolute majority has led to great expectations. That is a problem, since so far his party hasn’t delivered on most promises and is poised not to do so in the future, besides the expected pro-Russian stance on the question of Ukraine. As soon as he became Bulgaria’s newly elected Prime Minister, Radev insisted that no military aid would be provided to Ukraine: he argued that Bulgaria didn’t have anything left to give, and that it didn’t wish to anyway. Furthermore, he insisted that Bulgaria wouldn’t be interested in siding with Ukraine, as Radev pushed for the narrative that only diplomacy would end the war. This was echoed by his former vice-president, Ilyana Yotova, who now serves as the interim President and stated that the war cannot be won by military means. Europe raised eyebrows at what was perceived as undiplomatic behaviour when Radev declined Emmanuel Macron’s offer to participate in the Coalition of the Willing, because “Bulgaria doesn’t belong” with those who help Ukraine.
In spite of his positions on Russia, Radev is also a pragmatic leader. His campaign was premised on the idea that Bulgaria’s national interest would be heard in Brussels, even if his government wouldn’t go to the extent of Viktor Orbán’s illiberal government’s use of foreign policy vetoes. He is considered a Eurosceptic, alongside many of his government’s ministers, and temporarily blocked the EU’s 21st sanction package against Russia – which initially included Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church – on the belief that sanctioning religious figures constitutes warmongering and wouldn’t add any pressure on Moscow. Eventually, the EU accepted the demands and dropped the Russian patriarch from the list of sanctions.
With this attempt at trying to satisfy pro-European and pro-Russian Bulgarians, it was only a matter of time until Bulgarians would raise eyebrows against Radev’s government. The polls published by Market Links provide enlightening information in this sense, showing how only 35% of Bulgarians now approve of Radev, whose public support rate dropped by 8% in the span of his first two months in office from an initial 42%. Several decisions by the government help understand this sharp decrease.
The broken promises concerning social policy are one of the most relevant factors. During his campaign, Radev pledged the return of a social-first policy aimed at helping Bulgarians hit by inflation (driven by the wars in Ukraine and Iran). He also claimed a return to education and a state helping struggling families. Yet on 24 July, during a parliamentary vote, Radev’s party caused tensions after it voted against an opposition’s proposal to fund the National Children’s Hospital. This came only one month after Progressive Bulgaria had turned down another proposal by PP to increase from 50% to 100% the allowances for mothers returning to work before the end of their maternity leave, which caused protests in Sofia.
Another problem regards defence: Radev’s major argument against sending aid to Ukraine, besides warmongering, was that it would perceivedly drag Bulgaria in a foreign war that the country shouldn’t be involved in. Yet, he held a different view when it came to the US-led war in Iran, where Radev accepted the request of the U.S. to use Bulgaria’s military bases (first in Sofia, later in Yambol). In the case of the use of Sofia’s airport, the decision drew particular criticism as Radev hadn’t requested permission from the Parliament, as required by domestic law, in spite of the fact that public officials denied the involvement of US aircraft for military purposes. The move led Iran to request that Bulgaria reconsider their stance, and warned that it could become a target, as they may be labelled complicit with the U.S. This isn’t new to the Balkans: Romania, a few months prior, had also granted access to the U.S. Air Force, and Iran also threatened it with potential consequences.
Most crucially, Radev is disappointing his constituency regarding the first promise of Progressive Bulgaria: the dismantling for good of the Borisov-Peevski model. In fact, on 7 May Progressive Bulgaria chose to abstain from a parliamentary vote which proposed to create an investigating committee to shed light into Peevski’s finances, to make sure no illegal ventures were included. Democratic Bulgaria had in fact suspicions that Peevski had conducted illicit flights to the United Arab Emirates: an investigation in this sense could have given concrete evidence about the businessman’s sources of financing.
More at large, Radev appears unwilling to tackle the root causes that sparked the protests in late 2025, particularly over the draft budget law for the year 2026, which Bulgarians found scandalous. It was labelled as one of the worst since the fall of communism, as it would lead to higher salaries for the judicial and administrative branch, while young doctors struggle to make ends meet. In addition, police were supposed to obtain a higher salary, while the middle and lower classes couldn’t get their minimum wage increased because there wasn’t any money available for it.
Similar problems are likely to resurface during the discussions of the 2027 budget law. In particular, the issue of the minimum wage – currently fixed at 620 euros – will require some political capital to be modified, alongside the current state of Bulgaria’s deficit-to-GDP ratio, which reached a staggering 5.7% in 2026. This risks putting Sofia at odds with Brussels, as under the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, Member States must remain under the threshold of 3%.
Overall, Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria promised change, and it convinced Bulgarians that the Borisov-Peevski model representing corruption and maladministration would end. It promised to stop warmongering, but has instead exposed Bulgaria to the possible retaliation from the US-Iran war. As Radev continues to calculate which faction he wants to please, his popularity has paid the price for it, as he leaves more and more Bulgarians unhappy, isolating himself in Bulgaria and in Europe.
