The quiet mechanics of a Trojan horse: Russia’s path to sowing dissent in Bulgaria12 min read
Russia has long influenced Bulgaria’s history, education, identity and media, curating narratives that remain powerful. As the country navigates rising Euroscepticism, domestic political instability and the fallout from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the country finds itself at a crossroads between competing visions of its place in Europe – threatening fragile democratic rule.
This article examines Bulgaria’s vulnerability to Russian influence, focusing on the digital sphere. The first part explores historical narratives embedded within national identity, before discussing the post-1989 political and institutional landscape. The second half of the piece dips into the evolution of war-related disinformation, before exploring domestic misinformation and the role of local media ecosystems and identity politics in propelling propaganda narratives.
Within this discussion, it is important to maintain clear the distinction between misinformation – the sharing of false or inaccurate information without the intention to deceive – and disinformation – the deliberate creation or dissemination of false information with the intent to mislead, manipulate or harm.
Historical disinformation
Historical narratives within segments of Bulgaria’s public discourse have at times been shaped by external cultural and political influence, including communication and media activities linked to Russian State-connected actors, who have promoted interpretations of history and identity favourable to Bulgarian-Russian alignment. The roots of Bulgaria’s present-day vulnerability to Russian disinformation lie in how this history has been written.
For generations, Bulgarians have been told that Russia liberated their country from five centuries of Ottoman rule – a narrative unchanged since communist times. In reality, Russia’s 1877-78 intervention produced only partial independence, and full sovereignty came in 1908 for Bulgaria. The myth of liberation from the “Turkish yoke” endured, remaining influential and serving a positive perception of Russia.
Following a Moscow-backed coup in 1944, Bulgaria industrialised under Soviet influence while retaining its language and religion. Harsh political repression shaped Bulgaria’s experience – it learned to survive by keeping its head below the parapet. The Kremlin has since weaponised historical memory of World War II, benefitting from the fabrication of a neo-Nazi threat which is amplified in contemporary discourse.
How the past shapes the present
Disinformation concerning Bulgaria’s unification and its experience under Soviet occupation lay fertile ideational foundations for present-day positive perceptions of other types of disinformation messages spread by the Kremlin.
The fall of communism saw no formal institutional break with Moscow, as happened in many post-Soviet states, with the communist party rebranding itself as socialist. Former secret service networks, including State Security (DS) and other groups, morphed into oligarchic power structures. An example of this is Ilya Pavlov, former wrestler and DS-linked figure who built the powerful Multigroup conglomerate by acquiring major national industries during the turbulent post-communism transition. As a result, Bulgaria came to rely upon informal networks, experiencing what some commentators have described as “creeping state capture,” wherein societal resilience to Kremlin propaganda is diminished and democracy itself is reworked to maintain elite control.
Notwithstanding this context, Bulgaria has proven its will to reshape its international alignment and internal functioning. As confirmed in the 2024 Bulgarians and Democracy report, Bulgarians approve of democracy based on the rule of law, human rights and equality as a system of governance, but internal political disputes and multiple elections in recent years have led to dissatisfaction with how democracy works in the country. This hasn’t necessarily prevented alignment with Western Europe and the United States, however. Since the late 1990s, Bulgaria has drawn closer to the “West”, joining NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007. Support for Bulgaria’s membership of both NATO and the EU has increased substantially, although it remains fairly low in regional comparison, especially given Bulgarian society’s vulnerability to disinformation narratives.
In 2025, Bulgaria joined the Schengen Area, with pro-European governing parties, including GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) and We Continue the Change, viewing this as an opportunity to curb the rise of domestic radical and Eurosceptic forces. Political turmoil within Bulgaria has caused seven elections since 2021, and corruption remained widespread. Anti-European narratives are prolific, with a 2023 Human and Social Studies Foundation (HSSF) report on Russian online propaganda showing a growth in public disapproval of the EU from 13% to 23% from 2018 to 2023. Russia has long played on these narratives, demonstrating keen affection for Bulgarians and recognising them as first-class citizens, according to propaganda narratives.
With no colour revolution ever tearing Bulgaria out of Russia’s hands, pro-Russian sentiment has remained socially acceptable, even comforting, over the years.
War-related disinformation
The 2023 HSSF report showed that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 intensified Bulgaria’s disinformation environment. Long-standing anti-Western messaging and post-COVID disinformation voids converged with wartime propaganda, seeing familiar narratives re-woven to rehabilitate the eroded image of Putin and denigrate and vilify those who resisted the war by weakening solidarity with the democratic world and values.
Democratic instability within Bulgaria has created a favourable environment for the spreading of disinformation about Bulgaria’s place within the EU, political models of governance and the acceptability and unacceptability of alternatives outside of the EU. The pervasive informality through which Moscow exercises media influence has seen local figures, including media owners, journalists, politicians and businessmen, proliferate, at times, pro-Russian messaging, increasing Bulgarian vulnerability to external influences and damaging trust. A 2022 analysis by Global Analytics (Authoritarians on a media offensive in the midst of war) highlights how these actors function as local proxies within networks circulating Kremlin narratives, and notes that Bulgarian counterintelligence investigations suggest some public figures have received payments from Russia to influence public opinion.
The same report showed that Kremlin-aligned actors in Bulgaria have framed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in various ways – as a reaction to Western provocation, a defensive measure, or even a “denazification” effort, using these narratives as part of a broader strategic messaging campaign. These framings found receptive audiences in parts of Bulgarian society. In a comment provided for this article, Keith Peter Kiely, from the Bulgarian Romanian Observatory on Digital Media, noted that the messaging simplifies, deflects and distracts from Russia’s responsibility for invading Ukraine.
Kiely added that anti-Western and anti-EU rhetoric frequently portrays sanctions as ineffective, Western leaders as hypocritical and EU/NATO policies as harmful to Bulgarian sovereignty, tapping into legitimate criticisms while deflecting attention from Russian actions.
The HSSF report showed that Russian propaganda in Bulgaria promotes sovereignty not as democratic self-rule, but as loyalty to empire, tradition and authority. This logic surfaced during protests surrounding the dismantling of the Monument to the Soviet Army in Sofia, wherein supporters were branded fascists, accused of erasing history and threatened with “denazification” – language lifted from Russia’s justification for invading Ukraine. A 2023 report by Global Analytics titled History Undone showed that the status of communist/Soviet-era monuments in Bulgaria remains unresolved, with the campaign for monument demolition symbolising a crisis of visions for the future of Bulgaria.
War-related disinformation weaves between domestic disgruntlements including economic policy, electoral reform, corruption and cultural monuments, underlining suspicion towards democratic institutions and European integration.
Domestic political misinformation
A 2025 report by the EU Disinfo Lab showed that Bulgaria’s unstable political system – coupled with multiple domestic policy failures – created favourable conditions for the spreading of Russian disinformation.
Misinformation is pervasive across the political spectrum, especially around elections, reforms and governance, including voting technologies, constitutional change, judicial independence, public finance and EU policy, Peter Kiely told Lossi 36.
Leading up to the eurozone accession discussions, analysts identified coordinated disinformation activity linked to Russian influence networks that were reported to circulate narratives undermining public support for euro adoption by emphasising potential economic harm and loss of sovereignty. Selective truths, exaggerated risks and conspiratorial framing fuelled cynicism and heightened vulnerability to external influence. Pro-Kremlin messaging contributed to the politicisation of the debate by fuelling economic fears and framing accession as an identity battle. Subsequent demonstrations generated high online engagement but relatively limited street mobilisation. Although the euro was adopted on January 1, 2026, tensions persist, with debates being mobilised by anti-EU and pro-Russia actors.
The recent anti-budget protests, which resulted in the resignation of the government, further demonstrate how domestic grievances can be weaponised by Russian proxies through their disinformation narratives. The scale and cross-generational turnout at these protests marked one of the most consequential civic mobilisations since 1989. Resentment against rising costs, contested public spending priorities and perceived fiscal mismanagement evolved into broader opposition to corruption and the political establishment itself. With political actors appearing reactive rather than responsive, external narratives were often successful in framing the political discourse in line with their strategic interests.
Dismissive attitudes towards public concerns and performative government optimism worsen an already precarious situation, increasing vulnerability to meddling.
Local amplification and media ecosystems
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russian information operations in Eastern Europe have expanded in scale and complexity, relying increasingly on digital platforms to circulate narratives that are adapted to local political and cultural contexts. In Bulgaria, these external narratives have become interwoven with long-standing historical and identity-based grievances, gaining traction within domestic media ecosystems.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, a network of 370 anonymous pseudo-news websites – identical in layout and content – began pushing pro-Kremlin narratives, particularly through Facebook and Telegram. The goal was not simply persuasion, but exhaustion, flooding the information space until truth became optional while cementing decades of strongly-held beliefs about Russia. These “mushroom” sites functioned as echo chambers, suffering from a lack of moderation and cross-posting from Russian sources. Fake stories abounded, such as those alleging that Ukraine had committed genocide against the people of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.
A 2024 report by the Centre for the Study of Democracy found that former military, intelligence and security elites, leftover from a bygone era of communist and KGB rule, act as influential brokers in mainstream and fringe media outlets, appealing to themes of patriotism and national security while legitimising pro-Russian narratives. A 2025 study mapping disinformation in Bulgaria found that following the Ukraine invasion, Russian officials – including Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Kremlin Spokesperson Maria Zakharova – became primary propaganda channels, their statements echoed by many Bulgarian politicians and commentators who adapted Kremlin talking points to local grievances.
Bulgaria’s contested online space sees strong reactions, especially among the political class, to satirical social media accounts. The digital sphere is highly contested and politically charged, and in an information space saturated with propaganda and anonymous pseudo-news networks, the line between policing satire and countering disinformation is easily crossed, further threatening democratic structures. During the recent eurozone protests, MEP Rada Laikova alarmed hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians by sharing the false claim that the European Commission planned to introduce an “expiry date” on bank deposits after Bulgaria joins the eurozone, causing citizens to potentially lose their savings.
Facebook has replaced traditional news outlets for large segments of the population, a shift accelerated by COVID-19. A 2023 EU Disinfo Lab report found that when the pandemic faded, anti-vaccine groups, which had become hubs of conspiracy, switched to pro-Kremlin content. As algorithms reinforced radicalisation, private frustrations became collective outrage. The aforementioned 2025 EU Disinfo Lab study highlighted how Russian proxies increasingly reframed open support for Russia as patriotism and that nostalgia for the pre-1989 era of Soviet influence was rife, particularly on social media. These narratives resonated with pre-existing anti-Western and anti-liberal frames, intensified by algorithmic amplification. The selective memory of “liberation” and hostility towards liberal reforms fused into one coherent worldview – which, when encountering a broad lack of media literacy, was persuasive.
Social tension and identity
A 2024 report by the European Union Institute for Security Studies on foreign interference showed that following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Bulgaria’s whole information space was flooded with pro-Kremlin, pro-neutrality and anti-EU narratives. While public support for Putin declined, Russian messaging depicted the West as an aggressor, highlighting energy dependence on Moscow and portraying Bulgaria as a victim of Western influence. Disinformation framed NATO and Ukrainian “fascism” as the causes of Russia’s invasion, dividing public opinion and threatening democratic norms.
Identity-focused propaganda emphasised a sense of “brotherhood,” resonating with the lived reality of many Bulgarians living in Western Europe who had faced discrimination. Personal hardships were reframed as civilisational conflict, with Putin’s self-proclaimed messianic role as protector of Eastern Orthodoxy and traditional conservative values reinforcing Russia’s image as a defender of Bulgarian sovereignty.
This rhetoric aligns with the broader “Russkiy Mir” (“Russian World”) ideology – a civilisation concept that portrays Russia as the protector of Russian speakers, Orthodox Slavs and culturally-affiliated communities beyond its borders. While Bulgarians are not presented within this as ethnically Russian, pro-Kremlin discourse frequently situates them within a shared Orthodox-Slavic space, bound by historical memory and spiritual kinship. In this framing, Russia assumes the role of civilisational patron against a morally “decadent” West.
However, these narratives selectively omit inconvenient truths. Russia has kept quiet for decades about the over 200,000 ethnic Bulgarians living in Ukraine, particularly around Odesa, whose presence complicates the Kremlin’s “Russkiy Mir” war framing. If Moscow’s intervention is justified as the defence of threatened Orthodox or Slavic communities, the absence of concern for Bulgarian Ukrainians exposes the flexibility of this logic. Unlike the narrative of “persecuted Russians,” Bulgarian Ukrainians are not presented as victims, making their invisibility strategic.
Many Ukrainian Bulgarians relocated to Bulgaria after 2022 – as refugees, not “liberated compatriots”. The 2023 EU Disinfo report showed how disinformation proxies about Ukrainian refugees often exaggerate numbers, allege welfare abuse, and associate refugees with crime and instability, portraying them as a problem for Bulgaria. This exploits existing socio-economic anxieties and identity cleavages, deepening social division and propelling pro-Russian discourse.
Weapons of the state
A 2023 report by the Western Balkans Anti-Disinformation Hub showed that disinformation operates as emotionally charged information warfare, eroding trust in democratic institutions and expert knowledge. Reliable sources of information are largely absent from the same digital spaces where disinformation thrives, creating an informational vacuum on high-risk platforms like Telegram, Facebook and TikTok. This facilitates the unchecked spreading of propaganda and false narratives, while messaging jumps from platform to platform, adapting to tone, format and emotional appeal.
Many young Bulgarians seek domestic political stability and support the anchoring of Bulgaria within the European Union. Social media in Bulgaria, despite its limitations, has become a space for coordination and counteraction against pro-Kremlin narratives. Whether or not a Russophile party seizes power in the next election, history has proven that Moscow doesn’t need victory: sharp power and a grip on the collective conscience suffices.
Bulgaria has at times been described as a potential Russian “Trojan horse” within the EU or NATO, but unresolved historical narratives, institutional fragility and a saturated information environment are capable of eroding democracy without direct orchestration. Russia benefits from weakened trust, cemented divisions and impeded decision-making. Strengthening resilience to disinformation forces depends on credible democratic reforms, media literacy and a stronger sense of belonging within the European community.
